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Introductory Note to Dott. Vito Cozzoli's
ParliamentaryGroups in the Evolving Italian
PoliticalSystem
Dante Figueroa*

This article authored by Dott. Vito Cozzoli, general counsel for
the Chamber of Deputies at the Italian Parliament, concerns the
role of parliamentary groups in the current Italian political system, and comes at a meaningful time in the development of parliamentary democracies in the Western Hemisphere. In effect, the
post-World War II reconstruction of Europe occurred through political regimes centered around the prominent role of parliaments,
as opposed to the former regimes based on the unmatched dominion of the executive branch. Italy's most recent political and constitutional upheavals illustrate this reality.
In this context, Dott. Cozzoli's article clearly identifies the current political debate and its constitutional ramifications in Italy:
namely, whether the parliamentary system in vogue should be
centered in disciplined and solid political parties or directly on the
political representatives of the people. The response to this conundrum does not seem to emerge in a clear manner from Italy's
current parliamentary scheme. In fact, the current debate, as the
author points out, delves into the question of the extent to which
the role of parliamentary groups should be protected, increased, or
diminished, in order to provide a stable and functional development for the Italian political system. In this sense, neither the
Italian nor the American paradigms offer a panorama of full political discipline within their legislative deliberative bodies. However, as the author notes, the Italian structure, which extends meaningful protections to parliamentary groups, goes far beyond the
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perceived legislative autonomy witnessed at the United States
Congress.
In turn, the author draws comparisons between the fragmentary parliamentary system currently found in Italy and the somehow unified semi-presidentialist scheme ("semi-presidentialist" is
a standard jargon in comparative constitutional law, mainly in
Europe) reigning in the United States. Consequently, the author
clarifies that the parliamentary "caucuses" in the United States
bear no resemblance to the fractured Italian parliamentary
groups; the difference resides in the strength of the former as opposed of the nearly unchecked freedom of action benefitting the
latter. In a sense, the author conveys the notion that even though
both the United States and the Italian forms of government rely
on the principle of majoritarianism, over the years the Italian
scheme has created a series of mechanisms that have attenuated
an overwhelmingly influential majority.
Those majoritytempering mechanisms include the assignment of important parliamentary roles to minority political movements and actors
through the formation of autonomous parliamentary groups,
which are recognized and validated through internal parliamentary regulations.
The author also asserts that the Italian parliamentary system
based on parliamentary groups is to be regarded as a "transitional
phase." Doubtless, such description would be deemed politically
unrealistic if applied to the United States political system, where
the principles of checks and balances award, in theory, an equal
role to the three branches of government. Ultimately, that is not
the situation in Italy, where the legislative branch constitutionally
holds the upper hand in the government ofjthe country. This
year's political crisis in which Italy was without a government for
about two months is an example of the risks inherent to that system.
The comparatively younger American democratic experiment
has not (so far) yielded to a multiparty system; in fact, without the
support of one the two traditional parties, election to legislative
office is extremely unlikely and difficult. The commanding position of the established political parties determines the internal
organization of legislative leadership within the United States
Congress. In the Italian case, as the author demonstrates, a convoluted internal regulatory framework built upon a push-and-pull
scheme secures relevant leverage for parliamentary minorities
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and individual parliamentary members in ways which would be
unthinkable and unachievable in the current U.S. system.
Furthermore, the landmark institution of the "Mixed Group" existing in the Italian legislative arrangement does not find an
equivalent in the United States congressional organization, where
such a "melting pot" scheme would simply imply a destruction of
the present strict bipolarity defining it. Said differently, while in
Italy electoral laws seem to include an intense focus on the internal organization of the legislative branch, in the American model,
such laws pivot around the definition of electoral districts and
thus center on the composition itself of the legislative body.
The current "transitional" Italian parliamentary modus responds to the complex realities of a seasoned political sdciety that
has gone through different forms of government throughout its
long history. In turn, the American society has known only two
political systems, both of them enjoying a high degree of centralization: namely the British monarchy, and the current superseding
democratic experiment, which has lasted for a little over two centuries. In sum, Dott. Cozzoli's well-versed article clarifies concepts about the functioning of the Italian democratic system that
are difficult at first to grasp for the average American reader. The
author wisely and generously has opened a rich venue for research
on the topic of the role of parliaments in Western democracies,
and in that way-we hope-he is pioneering more fruitful exchanges between the American and Italian experiences.

